"Security Mindset: Lessons from 20+ years of Software Security Failures Relevant to AGI Alignment" by elspood

LessWrong (Curated & Popular)

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Ke2ogqSEhL2KCJCNx/security-mindset-lessons-from-20-years-of-software-security

Background

I have been doing red team, blue team (offensive, defensive) computer security for a living since September 2000. The goal of this post is to compile a list of general principles I've learned during this time that are likely relevant to the field of AGI Alignment. If this is useful, I could continue with a broader or deeper exploration.

Alignment Won't Happen By Accident

I used to use the phrase when teaching security mindset to software developers that "security doesn't happen by accident." A system that isn't explicitly designed with a security feature is not going to have that security feature. More specifically, a system that isn't designed to be robust against a certain failure mode is going to exhibit that failure mode.

This might seem rather obvious when stated explicitly, but this is not the way that most developers, indeed most humans, think. I see a lot of disturbing parallels when I see anyone arguing that AGI won't necessarily be dangerous. An AGI that isn't intentionally designed not to exhibit a particular failure mode is going to have that failure mode. It is certainly possible to get lucky and not trigger it, and it will probably be impossible to enumerate even every category of failure mode, but to have any chance at all we will have to plan in advance for as many failure modes as we can possibly conceive.

As a practical enforcement method, I used to ask development teams that every user story have at least three abuser stories to go with it. For any new capability, think at least hard enough about it that you can imagine at least three ways that someone could misuse it. Sometimes this means looking at boundary conditions ("what if someone orders 2^64+1 items?"), sometimes it means looking at forms of invalid input ("what if someone tries to pay -$100, can they get a refund?"), and sometimes it means being aware of particular forms of attack ("what if someone puts Javascript in their order details?").

فصل ها

1. "Security Mindset: Lessons from 20+ years of Software Security Failures Relevant to AGI Alignment" by elspood (00:00:00)

2. Background (00:00:18)

3. Alignment Won't Happen By Accident (00:00:42)

4. Blacklists Are Useless, But Make Them Anyway (00:03:00)

5. You Get What You Pay For (00:05:16)

6. Assurance Requires Formal Proofs, Which Are Provably Impossible (00:08:08)

7. A Breach IS an Existential Risk (00:10:55)